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Magee: The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitra

NOTE
THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO
JUDICIAL DEFERRAL OF LABOR
ARBITRATION AWARDS-HOW FAR
SHOULD EXPANSION GO?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years there has been a trend at the federal circuit court level to give an expansive reading to the public
policy exception to judicial deferral to labor arbitration awards.
Simply put, this exception provides that if an arbitrator's award
violates a well-defined public policy then the federal courts have
a duty not to enforce that award. The circuit courts of appeals
have been split over when a public policy has been violated for
the purposes of this exception. The traditional view is that public policy is violated only by an award which requires or condones a violation of law.' In this decade, and in particular since
1983, however, some courts have embraced the view that, if any
public policy has been violated by an arbitration award, the
courts have a right to refuse to enforce that award regardless of
whether the award violates or condones violation of a specific
law.' This latter view has come to be known as the expanded
version of the public policy exception.
This Note traces the roots of the public policy exception
1. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789
F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen
& Oilers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 673 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983);
Note, United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers: The Incredible Expanding Public Policy Exception to Arbitration Finality, 21 WILLAwrrE L. REV. 631
(1985).
2. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Great W. Food
Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983); Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
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and follows its development to the present. It explores the pros
and cons of both the traditional and expanded versions of the
exception and points out the pitfalls inherent in an ill-defined
expanded version of the exception. Further, this Note looks at
the Supreme Court's recent decision on this matter in United
Paperworkers International Union v. Misco3 and assesses the
effect this decision may have on lower courts' application of the
public policy exception.
II.

HISTORY OF JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION
AWARDS

A.

Pre-Trilogy Arbitration and JudicialIntervention

Throughout the history of judicial review of labor arbitration awards courts have shown an ingrained reluctance to defer
to awards they felt to be unfair or wrong. Prior to the Supreme4
Court's decisions in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills

and the Steelworkers Trilogy,5 state appellate courts expressed
this reluctance primarily in the refusal to enforce arbitration
awards with which they disagreed.
The state courts used common-law principals in determining whether to enforce arbitration awards. Under the commonlaw tradition, courts were to reach a decision on the enforcement
of an arbitration award without reviewing the merits of the
case.6 Despite requiring this apparent deferral to the judgment
of the arbitrator, the common law did provide several exceptions
under which courts could deny enforcement of the award. A
court could deny enforcement if it found fraud, partiality, or
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator. 7 These grounds are relatively uncontroversial and are still valid today.' Another
3. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc.,

-U.S.

,

108 S. Ct. 364

(1987).
4. 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see infra text accompanying notes 18-21.
5. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); see infra text accompanying notes

22-27.
6. See Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration,33
331, 337 (1981).
7. Id. at 336.

NAT'L AcAD. OF

ARBs.

8. See R. GORMAN, BAsic TEXT ON LABOR LAW 580-603 (1976).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol39/iss2/5

2

1988]

Magee: The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor Arbitra
LABOR ARBITRATION AWARDS

ground commonly used by state courts to deny enforcement of
an award was want of jurisdiction. Courts often used this ground
as a means to reverse an arbitrator's determination on the
merits.9
The common-law ground most used and abused in setting
aside arbitration awards probably was a finding that an arbitrator had made a "gross mistake." As some commentators have
noted, this finding was "an open invitation for a court to substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator."'10 Rice v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc." provides an illustration of such
judicial intervention. In Rice a Texas appellate court set aside
three arbitration awards in which an arbitrator had reviewed the
evidence and construed a collective bargaining agreement clause
requiring "sufficient cause" for discharge. The arbitrator had determined that, based upon his reading of the "sufficient cause"
clause, the evidence was insufficient to support the discharges.
The court found this determination to be in error and, therefore,
did not enforce the awards. 1 2 Rice is illustrative of the reluctance of courts to defer to arbitration awards which appear to
them to be in error.
"Gross mistake" was a generally accepted common-law
ground for overturning awards prior to the Steelworkers Trilogy.
After the Trilogy, however, courts often found that "gross mistake" was no longer a valid ground for refusing to enforce an
award in federal labor law cases. But the reluctance to defer has
persisted even after the mandates of the Trilogy.'3 As Professor
Kaden of Columbia University has stated, "[p]erhaps it is foolhardly [sic] to expect judges who daily interpret and apply standards codified in contracts, regulations, and statutes to stand
aside and enforce interpretations of collective bargaining agreements that seem to them excessively far off the mark."' 4 As
"gross mistake" has lost validity as a ground for refusal to enforce arbitral awards, federal courts recently have devised a new
vehicle by which they overturn what they view as erroneous

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
view, 80
14.

Morris, supra note 6, at 336.
Id.
244 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
See Morris, supra note 6, at 336-37.
See Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators:Observationson the Scope of Judicial ReCOLUM. L. REv. 267, 272-74 (1980).
Id. at 274.
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awards. This new vehicle is the expanded view of the "public
policy" exception.
The labor arbitration "public policy" exception, as some
courts now apply it, arose early in Black v. Cutter Laboratories.15 In this pre-Trilogy state-law case, an arbitrator found
that an employee, discharged ostensibly because she was a member of the Communist Party and had falsified her employment
application, was actually discharged because of her union activity. This violated the employee's union's labor contract with
Cutter Laboratories. The California Supreme Court refused to
enforce the arbitrator's award of reinstatement because forcing a
company that produced drugs for civilian and military use to reinstate a member of the Communist Party violated "public policy," as embodied in federal and state law. Black thus went beyond a traditional line of cases that allowed vacation of arbitral
awards that compelled or condoned the commission of an unlawful act."6 This controversial decision 17 laid the groundwork for
the modern day expansion of the "public policy" exception.
B. Steelworkers Trilogy and the Finality of Arbitration
Awards
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court decided in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills18 that a federal common
law of collective bargaining agreements should be developed by
the federal courts. This federal common law would apply in
most collective bargaining cases19 and would provide a continuity in the collective bargaining arena. In Lincoln Mills the
Court declared that promises to arbitrate were to be specifically
enforced.20 Since the Lincoln Mills ruling that federal law governs the review of arbitration awards, decisions such as Black,
which relied on state common-law principles, were relegated to

15, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905, cert. granted,350 U.S. 816 (1955), cert. dismissed,
351 U.S. 292 (1956).
16, R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at 597.
17. See, e.g., Kane Gas Light & Heating v. International Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers,
Local 112, 687 F.2d 673, 681 n.11 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
18. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. The federal common law does not apply to those few cases in which only statelaw issues are present.
20. See Kaden, supra note 13, at 268.
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the position of having little, if any, precedential value.21
The Supreme Court fleshed out the federal common law
dealing with collective bargaining arbitration agreements in the
Steelworkers Trilogy.2 2 For purposes of this Note, the most important of these cases is United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.,2 3 in which the Court enjoined federal courts
from reviewing the merits of an arbitrator's performance. Justice
Douglas wrote that in a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause it is the "arbitrator's construction
which was bargained for" 24 and not that of a judge. Justice
Douglas saw the limits placed on an arbitrator's contract interpretation as follows:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity
to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforce25
ment of the award.
This decision, which articulated the limits of judicial review
of arbitration awards, has been criticized as being too "cryptic"
to provide much guidance to lower courts in deciding when an
arbitration award should not be enforced. 26 Nevertheless, after
Enterprise Wheel the courts generally did defer to an arbitrator's decision and only refused to enforce their awards when one
of a small number of exceptions applied. The exceptions generally recited included arbiter misconduct, lack of arbiter jurisdiction, and "repugnancy" to superior law or public policy.27 It is
the expansion of this last exception based on "repugnancy" to
public policy which has posed the recent threat to the finality of

21. See 687 F.2d at 681 n.11.
22. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
23. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
24. Id. at 599.
25. Id. at 597.
26. See, e.g., Kaden, supra note 13, at 270.
27. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 625 F.2d 38, 42
(5th Cir. 1980).
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III. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

Since the decisions in Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers
Trilogy, several courts have recognized and applied, with varying degrees of fervor, the public policy exception to judicial
deferral to arbitration awards. This exception clearly existed
under federal law, 28 but the reach of the exception has been
hotly debated, particularly in the past few years.
The first case to take an in-depth look at the public policy
exception after the Steelworkers Trilogy was Local 453, International Union of Electrical Workers v. Otis Elevator Co.,29
which was decided in 1963. Otis Elevator dealt with whether an
employee had been discharged for just cause under a collective
bargaining agreement after he had been convicted of gambling
on the company premises.3 0 The company claimed that the discharge was for violating its rule against gambling. The union
filed a grievance on the employee's behalf and the case was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator concluded that, under all of
the circumstances, while the employee had been guilty of serious
misconduct warranting substantial disciplinary action, the company lacked "just cause" for his dismissal.31 The arbitrator reinstated the employee, finding that he had already been punished
for his crime, both by the state and by a seven month layoff
without pay. The arbitrator also found that four other employees, who were guilty of violating the same rule against gambling,
32
had not been disciplined by the company.
On appeal the district court determined that the award
should not be enforced because of its repugnancy to public policy.33 The district court stressed that the employee's action not

28. Any question about whether a public policy exception was applicable to judicial
deferral of arbitration awards was settled by the U.S. Supreme Court in W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757
(1983); see infra text accompanying notes 69-75.
29. 314 F.2d 25, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
30. The employee, Joseph Calise, was convicted of knowingly possessing policy
slips in the Otis plant in Yonkers, New York, in violation of New York Penal Law. He
was fined $250. Id. at 26.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27.
33. 206 F. Supp. 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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only violated company rules but also violated state laws and
could have exposed the owner of the premises where the viola34
tions took place to criminal prosecution.
The union appealed the district court's decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals which found the district court's
analysis of the public policy issue to be inadequate.3 5 The Second Circuit "assumed that arbitral awards contrary to public
policy are properly to be vacated by a court,"3 6 and recognized
that there "is a public policy which condemns gambling by an
employee on the premises of his employer. ' 37 But the court
found that the policy had been vindicated by criminal conviction
and punishment plus the seven month layoff without compensation. The court stated that the federal policy against gambling is
not so "[d]raconian" 38 as to require greater vindication than had
already been visited upon the guilty employee. Further, the
court stated:
[I]n light of the important role which employment plays in implementing the public policy of rehabilitating those convicted
of crime, there can hardly be a public policy that a man who
has been convicted, fined, and subjected to serious disciplinary
measures, can never be ordered reinstated to his former employment, particularly when the conviction was for his first offense and when the arbitrator found no indication that reinstatement would result in repetition of the illegal activity.39
The Second Circuit also dismissed the district court's concern that reinstatement would subject the company to prosecution under New York law. The court noted that "'[i]t is hard to
imagine that an employer who had specifically indicated his disapproval of gambling on the premises, had penalized the employee found guilty, and had warned the employee against any
such conduct in the future could be found guilty of violating the
statute.' "40 Based on this analysis, the Second Circuit held that

34. Id. at 855.
35. 314 F.2d at 28.
36. R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at 597. The Supreme Court took this same position
twenty years later in W.R. Grace. See supra note 28.
37. 314 F.2d at 29.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. R.v. 1199,
1209 (1962)).
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under the circumstances there was "no substantive principle of
federal labor law which authorize[d] denial of enforcement" of
the award of reinstatement for reasons of public policy.41
What did Otis Elevator, as the first case to address the issue
after the Steelworkers Trilogy, tell us about the public policy
exception? First, it recognized that such an exception did exist
in federal labor law. Second, the court implied that, if the public
policy which allegedly was violated by the award had already
been vindicated through other sanctions imposed by either penal
or employer action, then federal law did not authorize denial of
enforcement on public policy grounds. This was especially the
case when competing public policy considerations existed. At
least one court has interpreted Otis Elevator as supporting the
position that "only if upholding an award would amount to 'judicial condonation' of illegal acts, should the award be vacated
on grounds of inconsistency with public policy."42 Such an interpretation would have the public policy exception closely parallel
the uncontroversial exception that a court cannot enforce an
award which would require illegal conduct. This interpretation is
considered the traditional (and in some cases proper) interpretation of the public policy exception."3 Other courts have not read
the case so narrowly. These courts often cite Otis Elevator for
the proposition that a public policy exception exists and then
refuse to enforce an award that would not meet the traditional
test.44 Otis Elevator clearly did not provide a complete guideline

to the limits of the public policy exception.
In the twenty years following Otis Elevator, several courts
affirmed the existence of the public policy exception without doing much to clarify its limits. One often cited case, Banyard v.
NLRB,'4 appears to support the traditional interpretation of the

exception. Banyard dealt with the public policy exception as it

41. 314 F.2d at 29.
42. Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. International Bhd. of Firemen, Local 112, 687
F.2d 673, 682 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
43. Note, supra note 1, at 635; see also American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
44. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Great W. Food
Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983). Some cases factually similar to Otis Elevator have
found courts unwilling to enforce awards on public policy grounds. E.g., United States
Postal Serv. v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984).
45. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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related to the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) deferral to arbitration awards.46 James Banyard, a truck driver and
union steward, was fired by his employer of twenty-two years
when he refused to obey a dispatcher's instruction to drive a
truck that was admittedly overloaded in violation of Ohio law.47
The case proceeded through the grievance procedure provided
by the collective bargaining agreement between Banyard's union
and the employer. The issue reached an arbitration committee
which, in a tersely worded award, s denied the union's claims
that the company had violated sections of the National Labor
Relations Act and that Banyard should be reinstated. Meanwhile, the NLRB dismissed the union's unfair labor practice
complaint, which had been filed prior to the arbitration committee's award, and deferred to the committee under the Spielberg
doctrine.4 e Subsequently, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the NLRB with instructions to
consider the unfair labor practice issues.50 The court stated that
"for this or any other company to require its employees to act in
violation [of the law] can never be upheld by the Board or this
court." 51 The court adopted the dissenting NLRB members'
view that" '[n]o contract provision or arbitration award can permit an employer to require his employees to violate state laws or
to create safety hazards for themselves or others.' -152 The court
then concluded that, "[1]eft standing, the arbitral award below
grants the Company a license to violate state law and as such is
void as against public policy and repugnant to the purposes of

46. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has expressed its policy of deference to arbitration awards in its Spielberg Doctrine. This doctrine, enunciated in
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1090 (1955), states that the NLRB will accept the
results of an arbitration award as conclusive on legal issues as long as (1) the proceedings
were fair and regular; (2) both the company and union had agreed to be bound by the
arbitrator's award; and (3) the award was not repugnant to the Labor Management Relations Act.
47. The trial examiner found that the shipment in question was in excess of the
lawful weight under Ohio law. 505 F.2d at 343 n.6.
48. The award in its entirity stated: "Please be advised that the National Grievance Committee on December 2, 1971, adopted a motion that based on the transcript,
the claim of the Union be denied." Id. at 347.
49. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); see supra note 46.
50. 505 F.2d at 349.
51. Id. at 347.
52. Id. (quoting McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 710, 712 (1973) (Fanning and
Jenkins, Members, dissenting)).
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the National Labor Relations Act."53 Though Banyard dealt
with NLRB rather than court deferral to arbitration awards, it
shows that the District of Columbia Circuit seemingly equated
the public policy exception with the sanctioning of illegal
conduct.
Other courts, in cases decided in the early eighties, also
tended to show support for the traditional interpretation of the
public policy exception. In Perma-Line Corp. v. Sign Pictorial&
Display Union, Local 2305 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that "we will vacate an award as contrary to public policy
if it seeks to enforce a collective bargaining agreement provision
that is illegal under the National Labor Relations Act."55 In
Kane Gas Light & Heating v. International Brotherhood of
Firemen & Oilers, Local 11256 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "only if upholding an award would amount to
'judicial condonation' of illegal acts, should the award be vacated on grounds of inconsistency with public policy."5 That
court noted that "decisions of other circuits suggest that absent
such a finding that an award condones a violation of federal or
state law, the strong federal policy of encouraging labor arbitration dictates the enforcement of arbitration awards." ' Thus, it
appears that prior to 1983 the predominant view of the public
policy exception held by the federal courts was the traditional
view.
This analysis does not indicate that prior to 1983 some
courts were not considering an application of a broader public

policy exception. Still, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit noted only three
decisions which rejected "an award because it conflict[ed] with
the court's view of policy rather than with a specific statute or
regulation."5' 9 Two of those were state-law cases60 which the

53. 505 F.2d at 347.

54. 639 F.2d 890 (2nd Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 895. The court remanded the case to give the union a chance to show
that a clause under consideration was not illegal and stated that if the union was unable
to prove its legality, "then the arbitrator's award cannot be confirmed." Id. at 896.
56. 687 F.2d 673 (3rd Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).
57. Id. at 682.
58. Id. Kane cited as examples Otis Elevator and International Ass'n of Machinists, Dist. No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
820 (1969). Campbell Soup was factually indistinguishable from Otis Elevator and came
to a similar result; see supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
59. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 621 F.2d 756,
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Fifth Circuit found to be closely akin "to the traditional exception" for awards requiring or sanctioning violations of law."1 In
the third case, World Airways, Inc. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, 2 the Fifth Circuit noted that the relevant
public policy concerned the safety of air travel.63 Even in World
Airways the Ninth Circuit found that the reinstatement of a pilot to the position of Pilot-in-Command, after he had been demoted for several incidents that threatened the lives of passengers, would violate federal regulations which made it "the duty
of the carrier to determine the competency of its pilots in the
interests of public safety taking into account such things as 'personal characteristics that could adversely affect safety.' ",64 Thus,
any expansion of the public policy exception prior to 1980 was
minimal. In Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. InternationalAssociation of Machinists,"5 however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an award that struck down a company
rule prohibiting all smoking on the property of a company that
manufactured asbestos products violated public policy. The arbitrator found that the collective bargaining agreement denied
the company the power to enact such a rule if it could ultimately
lead to the discharge of offending workers. The court upheld the
arbitrator's award, since in this case the danger was primarily to
the smoker, but intimated that when the danger was to third
persons, such as aircraft passengers in World Airways, overturning the award on public policy grounds may be justified.
Two years later, in Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butchers Workmen v. Jones Dairy Farm,6 a federal
court vacated an arbitrator's award on public policy grounds, although its enforcement would not have violated any law. In
Jones Dairy Farm the arbitrator upheld a meat processing com-

759 (5th Cir. 1980).

60. Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 74 Ill.
2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979) (the award would have benefited teachers engaging in unlawful strike at the expense of those not engaging in it); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Sanford, 540 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (the award hindered the reporting and
prosecution of violations of the criminal law).
61. 621 F.2d at 759.
62. 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978).
63. 621 F.2d at 759.
64. 578 F.2d at 803 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 121.413(4)(ii) (1978)).
65. 621 F.2d at 756.
66. 680 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1982).
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pany's rule requiring employees to report deficiencies, violations,
or problems to company officials, rather than directly to federal
Department of Agriculture Inspectors. In upholding the district
court's vacation of the rule, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the rule facially defective because it was overly
for exigent circumstances, and thus vibroad and failed to allow
7
olated public policy.
IV.

EXPANSION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION

In 1983 the federal courts began their expansion of the public policy exception in earnest. Though such expansion had been
8 the impepresaged in Johns-Manville and Jones Dairy Farm,"
tus for the wholesale expansion can be found in dicta of the
United States Supreme Court case W.R. Grace & Company v.
Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber
Workers. 9
W.R. Grace presented the issue of federal court enforcement
of an arbitration award which provided backpay damages
against W.R. Grace & Company under a collective bargaining
agreement for layoffs the company had made pursuant to a
court ordered conciliation agreement. The conciliation agreement had been made with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) after that agency's district director had
found reasonable cause to believe that W. R. Grace & Company
had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.70 The ar-

67. Id. at 1145. The court wrote:
[T]he public policy involved here dictates that: (1) it is essential that the
health and welfare of consumers be protected by assuring that meat and meat
food products are unadulterated; (2) meat and meat food products be inspected to prevent traffic in diseased and unwholesome meats; (3) standards of
sanitation be enforced throughout the plant; and (4) USDA inspectors and the
Company be encouraged to join forces to maintain such standards of
sanitation.
Id. (citations omitted).
68. In Jones Dairy Farm the Seventh Circuit appears to have used an expanded
version of the public policy exception.
69. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The EEOC district
director found that there had been discrimination in the hiring of negroes and women at
W.R. Grace's Corinth, Mississippi plant. He also found that the company's departmental
and plant-wide seniority systems, as mandated by the company's collective bargaining
agreement, were unlawful because they perpetuated the effects of the company's past
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bitrator found that the collective bargaining agreement did not
extinguish the company's liability for its breach of the seniority
provisions of that agreement, even though a federal district
court order, coupled with the company's desire to lay off workers, mandated the breach.7 1 The company instituted an action to
overturn the award but the Fifth Circuit ultimately upheld the
arbitrator's decision.72 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.ls
One of the issues that the Supreme Court addressed was the
public policy exception. The court in three sentences outlined
the exception.
As with any contract ...a court may not enforce a collective-

bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy.... If
the contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it.
Such a public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not
from general considerations of sup74
posed public interests.'

The Supreme Court then found that enforcement of the arbitrator's award would not violate public policy essentially because
75
the "Company was cornered by its own actions."

The Court's brief exposition of the public policy exception
added little, if any, to earlier discussions of the exception. 76 Still,

these words seem to have had an important effect on later courts
considering the exception. The first circuit court case to address
the issue after W.R. Grace was Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen v. Great Western Food Co.,"7 which examined an arbitration award in favor of a company truck driver
who was discharged after a traffic accident. The truck driver admitted to a highway patrol officer at the scene of the accident
discrimination. 461 U.S. at 759.
71. 461 U.S. at 763.
72. 652 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1981).
73. 458 U.S. 1105 (1982).
74. 461 U.S. at 766 (citations omitted) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324
U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).
75. Id. at 770.
76. The court derived all of its statements about the exception from long settled
cases, in particular Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), which had provided the same
support to the Second Circuit in Otis Elevator.
77. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
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that he had taken a drink at the last truck stop before the accident. The driver's union took the case to arbitration, claiming
that Great Western lacked the necessary just cause required by
the collective bargaining agreement to discharge him. The arbitrator agreed and found that the company had failed to conduct
a thorough investigation of the accident, particularly the driver's
claim that a steering mechanism failure had caused the accident.
The arbitrator, however, refused to award backpay since the
driver admitted drinking prior to the accident.
The Fifth Circuit concluded from the above facts that the
driver's reinstatement would violate the "public policy of
preventing people from drinking and driving. 1' 8 The court used
most of its opinion to list cases, regulations, and statutes which
showed that the public policy against drinking and driving was
"'well defined and definite,'" and, thus, met the requirements
of W.R. Grace.7 9 The court took no note of the traditional view
that the public policy exception applies only if an award would
require or condone an illegal act. Evidently, the court felt that if
it could find a violation of a public policy "embodied in the case
law, the applicable regulations, statutory law, and pure common
sense,"80 then no further analysis was needed. The court did not
attempt to make an Otis Elevator analysis to balance the public
policy allegedly violated with the public policy in support of rehabilitation through re-employment. Thus, the Fifth Circuit, in
finding what it considered to be a well-defined public policy that
could have been violated by the reinstatement of the truck
driver, vacated the arbitration award on public policy grounds.
The next year, the First Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in
its adoption of an expanded view of the public policy exception.
In United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers
Union,8 ' the First Circuit tackled a dispute factually similar to
Otis Elevator. Postal Service concerned a post office window

78. Id. at 125.

79. Id. (quoting W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766). Most of the cases cited by the court
were pre-Trilogy cases. These cases include: NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F.2d

201 (5th Cir. 1942); NLRB v. United States Truck Co., 124 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1942);
Texas Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1941). The one post-Trilogy case cited was
World Airways. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
80. 712 F.2d at 125.
81. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Note,
supra note 1.
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clerk whose duties included handling money orders. The worker
was indicted and pleaded guilty to a charge of embezzling postal
funds. The Postal Service discharged the convicted worker and
his case was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ordered
that the employee be reinstated without backpay. He found that
the Postal Service did not have just cause for the discharge because the employee had showed an intention to pay back the
embezzled funds as evidenced by his prior repayments, his retention of records of fraudulent money orders issued, and his
seven years of service to the Postal Service without disciplinary
problems. s2
On appeal to the First Circuit, the Union argued in favor of
a traditional view of the public policy exception. "The heart of
the Union's argument is that although there may be a public
policy against embezzling Postal Service funds, there is no public policy against the Postal Service employing convicted embezzlers. You have to have something more-a direct legal prohibition." 3 The union presented two cases8 4 which the court
admitted exhibited "a particularly precise fit between the facts
of the case and the public policy vindicated,""5 but the court dismissed these cases because "an examination of the case law
reveals that such a close fit is not required."8' 6 The First Circuit
then discussed two cases it saw as appropriate precedents, Great
Westerns" and Jones Dairy Farm."'
Thus, the First Circuit adopted the position of the only two
post-Trilogy cases that had overturned an arbitration award
under the expanded view of the public policy exception. The
First Circuit went further than Great Western in its analysis by

82. 736 F.2d at 823.
83. Id. at 824.
84. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983) (arbitrator's award reinstating employee who had participated in strike vacated because of statute prohibiting employment
of individuals who had participated in strikes); General Teamsters Local Union 249 v.
Consolidated Freightways, 464 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (arbitrator's award upholding employer discharges of truck drivers who refused to drive trucks lacking mud flaps,
despite state law requiring such flaps, vacated because award compelled drivers to violate state law).
85. 736 F.2d at 824.
86. Id.
87. See cases cited supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
88. See cases cited supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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trying to distinguish Postal Service from Otis Elevator: the
court noted that the offense in Otis Elevator (gambling) was
tangential to the employee's factory job, whereas in Postal
Workers embezzlement of funds from money orders "went to
the heart of the worker's responsibilities."89 The court rejected
the notion that the employee could be rehired and put in a position where he would not be allowed to handle stamps and money
orders, and it noted instead that the employee could still violate
the public trust by handling mail that contained valuables. The
court also observed that the supervision of the employee which
would be required in such a reassignment could be too costly to
be practical. 0
Though the court in Postal Workers recognized well-defined
positive law supporting a public policy, and noted that this positive law could be violated if the employee was reinstated,9 1 it
spent an inordinate amount of time justifying its decision with
the "common sense implications" of the case, a notion evidently
borrowed from Great Western.2
[W]e cannot avoid the common sense implications that requiring the rehiring of [the employee] would have on other postal
employees and on the public in general. Other postal employees may feel there is less reason for them to be honest than
they believed-the Union could always fix it if they were
caught. Moreover, the public trust in the Postal Service, and in
the entire federal government,
could be diminished by the idea
3
that graft is condoned.

Thus, by 1984 the expanded version of the public policy exception had taken root in three circuits, and in two of those circuits, "common sense" had played a major, if not pivotal, role in
determining that a public policy would be violated if an arbitrator's award were enforced. The courts rejected deferral in these
89. 736 F.2d at 825.
90. Id.
91. The public policy that would be violated by reinstatement was not clearly
stated by the court, but it would appear that the policy would be that a postal employee
must be honest and reliable. Positive law cited by the court included the requirement
that a postal employee must swear that he "will well and faithfully discharge the duties
of the office on which [he is] about to enter." 736 F.2d at 825 (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 1011
(1980)) (brackets in original).
92. 712 F.2d at 125.
93. 736 F.2d at 825.
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cases despite the Supreme Court's directive that the public policy violated must be ascertained only through positive law "and
'9 4
not from general considerations of supposed public interests.
Since Postal Workers, no other circuits have explicitly embraced this expansive view of the public policy exception. Three
more cases, however, have been decided in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. The Seventh Circuit, which gave us Jones Dairy
Farm, decided two of those cases. Both International Union,
United Automobile Workers v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc.9 5 and E. L DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli
Employees Independent Association of East Chicago, Inc., 6
had minority opinions rejecting the way the new expanded exception was being used.
Keystone assessed an arbitrator's refusal to apply a waiver
provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) 97 when interpreting the annual funding requirement of a pension agreement. The Seventh Circuit found that
this refusal violated the clearly defined public policy behind the
enactment of ERISA.9 s The majority cited W.R. Grace, Great
Western, and Jones Dairy Farm for the proposition that an arbitrator's award can be overturned if it violates public policy,
but limited the discussion of the limits of this exception to a
bare recitation of the wording found in W.R. Grace.9 9 As noted
by the dissent, the majority concluded that the award jeopardized the continued existence of the pension plan by refusing to
allow Keystone to rely on the ERISA waiver provision and thus
violated the public policy behind the Act. 100 The dissent noted
that the Supreme Court had addressed a similar issue in W.R.
Grace, in which it stated that, absent a judicial determination,

94. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49,
66 (1945)).
95. 782 F.2d 1400 (7th Cir. 1986).
96. 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. _ 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1083 (1982).
98. 782 F.2d at 1403. "[Tlhe Supreme Court has held that one of Congress's central
purposes in enacting ERISA . . . was to prevent the loss of all retirement savings by
employees whose vested benefits in a pension plan are not paid when their employer
terminates the plan." Id. (Citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446
U.S. 359, 374 (1980)).
99. 782 F.2d at 1403.
100. Id. at 1413 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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neither a company nor a government agency (in Grace, the
EEOC; in Keystone, the IRS) could alter a collective bargaining
agreement without the union's consent. 101 "Permitting such a result would undermine the federal labor policy that parties to a
collective bargaining agreement must have reasonable assurance
that their contract will be honored.' 1 02 Thus, the dissent, while
not directly attacking the expanded view of the public policy exception, would have been much more conservative in finding a
violation of an acknowledged public policy when that policy
came into conflict with the federal policy that favors deference
to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement as interpreted
by an arbitrator.
The other Seventh Circuit case, DuPont,"°3 became a battle
ground between jurists divided over application of either the expanded or traditional views of the exception. DuPont concerned
an arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been
discharged after he experienced a mental breakdown that led
him to attack physically his supervisor. The arbitrator concluded that the employee could not be at fault for his actions
caused by the breakdown and, thus, his dismissal was without
just cause. The arbitrator ordered the employee's reinstatement,
noting that there was little likelihood that he would have another breakdown.
In discussing the application of the public policy exception,
the majority expressly adopted the expanded view and cited
with approval all of the cases which had used this view.10 4 They
flatly rejected the traditional view of the exception, noting that
"the courts have never construed the public policy exception so
narrowly.' 0 5 In particular, the court observed that in its earlier
decision in Jones Dairy Farm, "we never said that the work rule
violated any rule of positive law," and, thus, Jones Dairy Farm
was "incomplete harmony with the public policy exception as

101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of the

United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983)).
103. 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986).
104. 790 F.2d at 615-16.
105. Id. at 616. The court made this statement even though some courts, notably
the Third Circuit in Kane Gas and the D.C. Circuit in American Postal Workers Union,
had already adopted such a "restricted" view.
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stated today." 106 The court repeated the well-established principle that in reviewing an arbitration award the court should not
question the factual findings of the arbitrator, but rather should
determine whether, "assuming all of the facts found [by the arbitrator] are true, the enforcement of the award will violate a
public policy.

'1 07

The court then modified this well-established

rule by reasoning that the court's duty to make sure that an arbitrator's award did not violate public policy "would be impaired if a court had to defer to clearly erroneous factual findings made by the arbitrator."'' 08 The court suggested that
deferral to arbitrators' factual findings, a deference considered
virtually sacrosanct since Enterprise Wheel,10 9 should be revised
to a "clearly erroneous" standard. 110 The court enforced the arbitrator's award because it found that even under the "clearly
erroneous" standard the arbitrator's finding, that there was little
likelihood of a repeat breakdown, must be accepted. 11
Judge Easterbrook, while concurring in the result, strongly
dissented from the majority's adoption of the expanded version
of the exception. He argued that the court merely decided
whether the award cut at cross purposes with a policy it thought
valuable, 2 and asserted that the majority's view gave the court
too much power. He noted that courts lack this power for the
same reason as do arbitrators-because "the function of arbitrator and court is to carry out a contract, and contracts bind unless made unlawful by rules of positive law."" 3 Judge Easterbrook found that the majority's "loose" use of the public policy
exception violated a "real" public policy expressed in positive
law-the deference afforded to arbitration awards. 1 4 Thus,

106. 790 F.2d at 616.
107. Id. at 615.
108. Id. at 617.
109. 790 F.2d at 617.
110. Id.
111. 790 F.2d at 618 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. Judge Easterbrook cited 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982) which states that a court
"'must grant [an order enforcing an award] unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected'" because the arbitrator exceeded his authority. 790 F.2d at 618 (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)) (emphasis in original). "This makes enforcement of the award turn on the meaning of the contract, not on equitable notions about
public policy." Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
114. Id.
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Judge Easterbrook would have overturned the arbitrator's award
only in those cases in which the contract, as interpreted by the
arbitrator, violated a rule of law or when the arbitrator based his
award on public policy considerations and, thus, overstepped his
authority. 115 In effect, he adopted the traditional view of the
public policy exception.
The Fifth Circuit, in its latest journey into the public policy
exception debate, handed down what may be the most far reaching and controversial decision yet rendered in this area. In
Misco, Inc. v. United PaperworkersInternational Union1 6 the
court refused to enforce an award which it held contravened the
public policy against the "introduction of drugs into the workplace and consequent operation of dangerous machinery by persons under their influence.1 117 In Misco an employee, Isiah

Cooper, and two companions went to Cooper's car momentarily
and then went to another car and entered it. These actions were
under surveillance by police officers. A short time later Cooper's
two companions left the second car and returned to the plant.
Cooper remained in the back seat of the second car. The police
apprehended Cooper and found marijuana smoke in the car with
a lighted joint in the front seat ashtray. Cooper denied smoking
the marijuana, but (as the arbitrator found) testified falsely
under oath that he was standing outside the second car when
apprehended. A search of Cooper's own car produced some marijuana residue, but the company was unaware of this fact at the
time of Cooper's discharge. Upon these facts the arbitrator concluded that the company had not proved that Cooper violated
the company rule against bringing or using controlled substances
on company premises when it discharged him. The arbitrator ordered reinstatement with full backpay and seniority.
In its opinion refusing to enforce this award, the Fifth Circuit majority relied heavily on Great Western." 8 Since Cooper
was employed as an operator of dangerous machinery, the court
found striking factual similarities between Cooper's case and the
reinstatement of the truck driver who had admitted taking a
drink in Great Western. Two factual differences, however, could

115. Id. at 620.
116. 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, -

U.S. -.... , 108 S.Ct. 364 (1987).

117. Id. at 741.
118. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).
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have been used to distinguish Misco from Great Western and
would have supported enforcement of the award, even under the
expanded view of the public policy exception. In Great Western
the truck driver admitted drinking on duty and a police officer
issued him a citation to that effect. 119 In Misco Cooper did not
admit using marijuana and the arbitrator specifically found that
the company had not proven Cooper violated company rules by
bringing marijuana on the premises or by being intoxicated
there. If there had been no admission or evidence that the truck
driver had been drinking in Great Western, it is doubtful that
the Fifth Circuit would have overturned the arbitrator's award.
But in Misco, two years later, the Fifth Circuit did not even pay
lip service to the rule that the court should not "review the factual findings or merit determinations made in an arbitration
award.'

120

The Fifth Circuit Misco majority"2 launched a bitter

diatribe against the arbitrator's opinion, variously describing his
views as "whimsical,"'1 22 "curious, ' and "baffling,""" and then
seemingly laying the blame for the arbitrator's lack of ability on
the fact that his formal training "was as an engineer and not as
a lawyer.' 25 The court then put its own slant on the case by
noting that the evidence presented would "have sustained a civil
verdict and probably a criminal conviction.'

26

The court de-

rided the arbitrator's conclusion that at the time of discharge
the company had proven only that Cooper was sitting in the
back seat of a car in which there was a lighted marijuana cigarette in the front seat ashtray. 27 Apparently to bolster its case
that Cooper violated company rules, the court noted in passing
that it thought
it common knowledge that the narcotic effect of marijuana can
be obtained by simply sitting in a small enclosure where smoke
119. 712 F.2d at 123.
120. Id. (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 563 (1976); Local
No. 370, Baker Workers Int'l Union v. Cotton Bros. Baking Co., 672 F.2d 562, 564 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
121. The majority was composed of Circuit Court Judges Gee and Higgenbotham,
neither of whom took part in the Great Western decision.
122. 768 F.2d at 740.
123. Id. n.1.
124. Id. at 741 n.2.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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from it is present. It is not clear from the record whether or
not the car windows were closed, but-given that the incident
in late January-it is reasonable inferoccurred on an evening
128
ence that they were.
Here again we find a court bringing in the specter of "common
sense."
Last, the Fifth Circuit majority attacked the arbitrator's
conception of "industrial due process" by suggesting that he was
wrong not to consider laboratory tests conducted after Cooper's
discharge which discovered minute traces of marijuana on articles found in Cooper's car trunk. 129 The court stated that bringing "any" amount of the drug onto the company premises violated the law and company rules, and it suggested that the
arbitrator ignored this violation "in the name of safeguarding
Cooper's abstract procedural rights." 130 The court concluded
that these rights should not override a determination by the employer "that Cooper did bring marijuana onto his employer's

premises.' ' 131 Thus, the majority overturned the award on public
policy grounds.
Judge Tate, dissenting, could not go along with the majority's views even though he agreed with Great Western's expanded view of the public policy exception.1 32 Judge Tate noted
that "[iln their zeal to correct what the majority feels is a mistaken and misreasoned arbitration decision . . . [t]he majority
errs in refusing to accept the facts of non-violation found by the
arbitrator, simply because it disagrees with the arbitrator's
'' 33
reasoning. $
Misco points out the real possibility of abuse that can arise
from a public policy exception that has ill-defined limits. Courts,
using the exception as their rationale, may feel less compulsion
to defer to arbitrators' factual findings and, in effect, may return
to the days when arbitral awards were overturned for "gross
mistake"-or in the terminology of the majority in Dupont-when the factual findings are clearly erroneous. It is in

128. Id.
129. Id. at 743.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 744-45 (Tate, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743, 746 (Tate, J. dissenting).
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this case that the United States Supreme Court decided to address once again the public policy exception.
V. THE SUPREME COURT TACKLES Misco: WHAT ARE THE
GUIDELINES?

At the time the Supreme Court decided Misco, the expansive view of the public policy exception had been embraced by
three circuit courts. Since the Great Western case in 1983, only
one circuit 3 had openly refused to adopt the expanded view.
The attraction of this view to the courts is obvious.
The limitation that the Steelworkers Trilogy put on judicial
review of arbitration awards is an unnatural constraint when

compared with the greater latitude courts have in reviewing legal and factual determinations made by lower courts. As Professor Kaden has noted,"3 5 it is perhaps too much to ask judges to
defer to awards they see as clearly erroneous when they are accustomed to greater power in reviewing court decisions. But as
long as that award is derived from the "essence of the contract,"
the courts are required by Enterprise Wheel to enforce it unless
the award violates public policy. Using a vague, expanded public
policy exception, the courts have the power to overturn awards
they find misguided as long as it appears that a "well-defined"
public policy has been violated. The courts using the expanded
version of this exception appear to have recaptured, at least in a
limited fashion, the old common-law power to overturn an arbitration award because of a gross mistake.
It is an attractive idea that courts should be able to overturn awards which violate public policy. This is especially so
when public safety is concerned. In practically every case1 36 in
which the expanded version of the public policy exception has
been used to deny enforcement of an arbitral award, public
safety has been lurking in the background. Why should a company not be allowed to fire an employee who admittedly drank
134. The D.C. Circuit refused to adopt an expansive view of the exception in both
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.

1986) and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
135. Kaden, supra note 13, at 274.
136. One exception is the Postal Workers case, see supra note 91, in which the emphasis was on the public's right to have honest employees handle their mail.
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while driving a truck, or to discharge an employee who brought
marijuana onto the premises of a company where he operated
heavy equipment, or to demote a pilot who repeatedly had
shown he lacked the proper judgment to be entrusted with the
lives of passengers? Why should a court not be allowed to overturn an award that upheld a company rule which could adversely affect the quality of meat sold to the public? It is just
"common sense" that courts should right the mistakes made by
arbitrators in these decisions.
Maybe it does make sense for courts to correct these mistakes by using the public policy exception. One commentator
has suggested that the expansion of this exception be limited to
"the public policy interest in the protection of human life." 137
Even such a limited expansion of the exception, however, would
suffer problems if it lacked clear guidelines for implementation.
If the public policy exception is to be expanded beyond its traditional bounds, the United States Supreme Court must clarify
the exact parameters of the expansion and must give clear
guidelines to the lower courts regarding factors they may consider when applying the exception.
The Supreme Court had the chance to delineate these
guidelines in Misco.1 38 In arguments before the Court, the union
took the traditional position that the award could not be set
aside unless it ordered conduct that violates the positive law.
The company, of course, took the expanded view. The Supreme
Court had a clear opportunity to settle the matter.
The Court could have taken one of at least three routes in
the case. First, it could have affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision
with little or no comment. This approach would have been the
least satisfying of the possible outcomes because it would have
provided Court approval for the expanded version of the exception without providing proper guidelines for its application. A

decision of this sort could have precipitated the flood of cases
traditionalists have warned could endanger the viability of judicial deference to arbitral awards.
Second, the Supreme Court could have specifically adopted
either the traditional or the expanded version of the exception.

137. Note, supra note 1, at 643.
138. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., .. U.S. _., 108 S. Ct. 364
(1987).
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Adoption of the traditional version would have had the advantage of not requiring elucidation of the parameters of the exception, for they are already well-known. On the other hand, adoption of an expanded version would have required a clear and
precise delineation of the exception's boundaries. Promulgating
useful guidelines would have been difficult because any court
wishing to overturn an arbitral award on public policy grounds
must balance the violated public policy against the explicit federal policy in favor of judicial deferral. Balancing tests rarely
give clear and precise guidelines.
The Court, however, took another route. It avoided the direct question of whether public policy can be used to overturn
an arbitral award only when a positive law is broken or its violation condoned"'9 and made alternative findings on why this particular case should be overruled. The Court started by reviewing
the Steelworkers Trilogy guidelines of judicial deferral to arbitrators' awards. In doing so the Court gave an indication that it
embraced the traditionalist view of the exception. At least one
circuit court had noted that the expanded version of the exception is in blatant "disregard of the teachings of Enterprise
Wheel and W.R. Grace. 1 40 The Supreme Court in Misco reaf-

firmed the concept of judicial deference to arbitral awards as set
out in the Steelworkers Trilogy.
Further, the Court took up the traditionalist argument that
the parties to a collective bargaining contract with an arbitration
clause have contracted to have their disputes settled by an arbitrator rather than a judge. Under this view, the arbitrator is a
creature of the collective bargaining contract. He is selected by
the parties to settle disputes over issues that have been agreed
upon as proper subjects for arbitration. Thus, courts reviewing
the arbitrator's award are bound by the arbitrator's finding of
facts and interpretation of the contract. The Supreme Court
clearly endorsed this view in Misco.41 Although these notions
are traceable back to the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court
breathed new life into these precepts in Misco. The Supreme
139. Id. at
, 108 S. Ct. at 374-75 n.12.
140. 789 F.2d at 9.
141. U.S. at .,
108 S. Ct. at 372. The award, however, must draw its essence
from the contract and the arbitrator should not issue his own brand of industrial justice.
Id. at .,
108 S. Ct. at 371.
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Court also repeated the notion that a court cannot overturn an
arbitrator's award simply because it disagrees with the facts as
the arbitrator found them or even if it finds that an arbitrator
made a serious error in his interpretation of a contract.142 Of
course, a court can overturn an award procured by fraud or
143
through the arbitrator's dishonesty.

In applying these precepts to the facts in Misco the Supreme Court essentially held that the Fifth Circuit could not
overturn the award either because it found that the arbitrator's
fact finding was faulty or because it disagreed with the arbitrator's choice of procedural rules.1 44 The Court implied that, for a

procedural mistake by an arbitrator to be grounds for overturning an award, the mistake must be in bad faith or so gross as to
amount to affirmative misconduct. 45
The Supreme Court further noted that, even if Cooper had
violated company rules against the use of marijuana on the company's premises, an arbitrator normally has the discretion to disagree with and modify a sanction imposed for employee misconduct. "4" Of course, the collective bargaining contract could
modify or limit the arbitrator's discretion in imposing sanctions,
but the contract is interpreted by the arbitrator and if he interprets it to give him the right to modify the sanction, he has that
right.
Last, the Court addressed whether the public policy
"'against the operation of dangerous machinery by persons
under the influence of drugs or alcohol' "141 is the type of public
policy which, if violated, merits setting aside an arbitral award.
The Court recounted the public policy exception's roots in the
common-law concept that a court will not enforce a contract
that violates the law or public policy.

81

The Court recited the

W.R. Grace guidelines for overturning an arbitral award 1 49 and
gleaned what it considered to be two important points: (1) a
court may refuse to enforce a collective bargaining agreement
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144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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Id.
Id. at - 108 S. Ct. at 372.
Id.
Id. at ., 108 S. Ct. at 373 (quoting 768 F.2d at 743).
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Id.
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when the specific terms of that agreement violate public policy;
and (2) the W.R. Grace decision does not sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitral awards on public policy grounds.
The Court found that, although the public policy embraced
by the Fifth Circuit in Misco was "firmly rooted in common
sense,"' 15 it was not supported by the kind of analysis which
would demonstrate it was "well defined and dominant"'' as required in W.R. Grace. Thus, the Court did not hold directly that
the public policy against using drugs in the workplace where
dangerous machinery was in operation could not be used to
overturn an arbitral award. Its direct holding only found that
the Fifth Circuit had not proved that the policy was "well defined and definite" under the W.R. Grace approach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

What did the Supreme Court's holding in Misco do to clarify the limits of the public policy exception? It did not finally
settle the matter. The Court did not address "the issue upon
which certiorari was granted: whether a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award rendered under a collective-bargaining agreement on public policy grounds only when the award itself violates positive law or requires unlawful conduct by the
employer.' 52 A decision on that question could have cleared up
the whole situation.
Even absent a ruling on the above question, however, the
Court indicated that it favors a traditionalist view of the exception. The Court provided some guidelines for determining when
a violation of a public policy justifies overturning an arbitration
award. First, the Court reiterated that courts cannot reconsider
the merits of an arbitral award even if the award rests on an
error of fact or an arbitrator's misinterpretation of a contract.
This limitation in itself is enough to prevent decisions like the
Fifth Circuit's Misco ruling in which the court simply disagreed
with the arbitrator's findings and procedural methodology.
Second, it established that compliance with the requirements of W.R. Grace is a prerequisite to overturning an arbitral

150. Id. at
151. Id.

152. Id. at

108 S. Ct. at 374.
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108 S. Ct. at 375 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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award on public policy grounds. The reviewing court must "[a]t
the very least" 153 show that the public policy is "ascertained 'by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.' "1" The Court
made clear that "common sense" falls into the latter, rather
than the former, category. Further, the Misco ruling set a minimum requirement and, as Justice Blackmun implied, more may
be needed.
A court reviewing an arbitration award after Misco, therefore, cannot be confident in the limits of its power to alter the
award. What if the Fifth Circuit had not ignored the facts as
found by the arbitrator and had cited the "laws and legal precedents" necessary to comply with the W.R. Grace requirements
for showing that the policy was "well defined and definite"?
Could a court then overturn the award? In Misco the Supreme
Court stated that to alter an award a reviewing court must show
clearly that the policy will be violated if the award is enforced.' 5 5
Considering that the Supreme Court found no violation of public policy in W.R. Grace,156 the last requirement clearly is not
easily met.
Thus, while the Supreme Court did not address directly
whether the traditional view of the public policy exception is the
correct view, the guidelines that it set forth for overturning an
award on public policy grounds do give an indication of the limits that may eventually emerge. If the traditional view is not ultimately adopted, then at least the expansion will not be allowed
to exceed greatly the limits of that view. The Supreme Court
may not have endorsed openly the traditional view in Misco, but
the tone and strictures of the case may chill the tendency of federal courts to stray far from the traditional view when faced
with public policy arguments in the future. The expansion of
that exception has been stopped and is being contracted. The
question now is how far the contraction will go.
James Michael Magee
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